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THE ARBITRATORS' DUTY TO RESPECT
THE PARTIES' CHOICE OF LAW IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CINDY G. BuYst
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is all about choice. The parties choose whether
to arbitrate their disputes, whom the decision-makers will be,
where the arbitration will take place, and what procedures will
be applied.1 One of arbitration's defining characteristics is party
autonomy, which is sometimes used specifically to refer to the
parties' ability to choose the law that will govern their dispute.
2
As noted by one scholar, "The right of parties to themselves
identify the law to apply and the obligation on arbitrators to
respect that choice is the one overwhelming and truly
international conflict of laws rule which [sic] has developed in
international commercial arbitration."3 By contrast, in domestic
commercial arbitration, 4 outdated parochial rules sometimes still
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1 Arbitration has been defined as a process whereby parties voluntarily agree to
refer their disputes to an impartial third person or persons selected by the parties
for a decision that is final and binding on the parties. Parties usually make these
choices by way of a written contract or agreement, referred to as the arbitration
agreement. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:1 (Larry
E. Edmonson ed., 3d ed. 2003); THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
1:5 (3d ed. 2004).
2 See JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 69 (1978); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory
Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471 (1989).
3 LEW, supra note 2, at 582.
4 For purposes of this article, I use the term "domestic commercial arbitration"
to refer to arbitrations with little or no connection to any country other than the
United States. For example, such an arbitration would be between two commercial
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apply to invalidate the parties' choice of applicable law. 5 In such
cases, arbitrators and reviewing courts will not honor the
parties' choice of law unless the law chosen bears a reasonable or
substantial relationship to the parties or the underlying
transaction.6 The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that
there is no valid reason to disregard the mutually agreed-upon
choice of law made by the parties to an arbitration agreement
arising out of a commercial transaction, provided that there are
no extenuating circumstances. 7
While there is much scholarly debate regarding the extent to
which parties are free to choose the law applicable to their
disputes,8 few, if any, of these scholars consider how these
arguments differ in the context of domestic commercial
arbitration as opposed to litigation. As a result, arbitrators who
face this issue have little guidance. This article contends that
entities, both of which are United States residents or citizens, and involving a
contract that is made and is to be performed in the United States.
5 See discussion infra Part IV.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
7 The proposal for greater party autonomy is limited to arbitration agreements
arising out of commercial transactions, and would exclude consumer or employment
arbitrations where there may be a significant difference in the bargaining power
between the parties such that strict observance would be unfair. For purposes of
this article, a "commercial transaction" is defined as a contractual relationship
between two or more businesspersons or entities acting in their capacity as such.
One method of ensuring a certain level of business sophistication in connection with
such agreements would be to create a monetary threshold that must be met before
the rule would apply, as has been done by some states. See infra Part 1V.D.
8 See, e.g., Friedler, supra note 2, at 479-84 (giving an overview of the modern
approaches to choice-of-law issues); Richard K. Greenstein, Is the Proposed U.C.C.
Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159, 1159-61 (2000)
(questioning whether the proposed amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code,
requiring that choice-of-law clauses be enforced whether or not the transaction
bears any relation to the state designated, violates constitutional principles); Philip
J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International Conflict of
Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 258 (1999) (exploring whether the distinction
between public and private law issues remain useful when analyzing which
provisions are appropriate objects of conflicts analyses); Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing
Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 247 (1993) (arguing that the policies that
support a presumption of enforcing choice-of-law clauses extend to all contexts);
Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of
Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 67 (1981) (suggesting that
"significant constitutional limitations on choice of law" are "aberrations"); Barry W.
Rashkover, Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for Contractual Disputes:
Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 227, 227 (1985) (explaining
that the debate over choice-of-law clauses focuses on the competing values of the
recognition of interested jurisdictions' legislative policies and party autonomy).
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domestic commercial arbitration is more similar to international
commercial arbitration than to domestic litigation, such that the
conflict of laws rules that apply in international commercial
arbitration should apply to domestic commercial arbitration as
well. The corollary to this theory is that there are significant
differences between commercial arbitration and commercial
litigation, such that different conflict of laws rules ought to
apply. Thus, arbitrators and reviewing courts should respect the
choice of law made by the parties to a domestic commercial
arbitration agreement regardless of whether there is any
connection between the underlying transaction and the law
chosen, just as is done in international commercial arbitration.
The remaining parts of this article expound upon this
theme. Part I provides a hypothetical example of how this choice
of law issue could arise and its potential consequences. Part II
briefly describes the evolution of attitudes towards arbitration
generally and specifically with respect to party autonomy over
the last century. Part III explains why arbitrators and
reviewing courts should honor the parties' choice of law in the
context of domestic commercial arbitration agreements. Part IV
explains how judicial conflict of laws rules may come into play in
arbitration and how they may operate to undermine party
autonomy in some cases. Part V responds to constitutional and
public policy concerns that have been raised with respect to
allowing parties to choose a law that has little or no connection
to the parties or their agreement. This part analyzes the debate
regarding whether parties should be given greater autonomy in
the context of domestic commercial arbitration as compared to
litigation. Finally, the Article concludes that a greater respect
for parties' choices of law will allow for more efficient dispute
resolution.
I. AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM
Imagine that Penn Ocean, a Pennsylvania company, owns
several ocean-going vessels, each worth several million dollars.
Imagine further that one of the vessels requires significant
repair, which will cost approximately one and a half million
dollars. Penn Ocean solicits bids for the work from various
shipyards around the United States. As part of its bid-proposal
package, Penn Ocean includes a draft contract that it used for a
previous ship repair transaction with a Massachusetts shipyard.
2005]
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The draft contract contains a clause requiring that all disputes
arising out of or in connection with the contract be resolved by
arbitration in Pennsylvania, but selects Massachusetts law to
govern. Penn Ocean proposes Massachusetts law because
Massachusetts has some of the oldest operating shipyards in the
United States, and therefore has some of the most well-
developed law relating to ship repair contracts. Additionally,
Penn Ocean became familiar with Massachusetts law in its past
ship-repair transactions involving the Massachusetts shipyard.
Penn Ocean receives bids from shipyards in several states,
but the most competitive bid comes from a large and well-
established shipyard in Louisiana. Accordingly, Penn Ocean
enters into intense and prolonged negotiations with the shipyard
in Louisiana. The parties and their attorneys agree to amend
many parts of the original draft contract through negotiations,
but leave the arbitration and applicable law clauses as originally
proposed by Penn Ocean. Penn Ocean is particularly glad not to
have Louisiana's law apply because of its unfamiliarity with a
civil law system.
In this scenario, why should two large, sophisticate'd and
experienced companies not be allowed to choose another state's
law to govern their transaction if they so desire? Both sides
made an informed and conscious choice and had expert legal
representation. Thus, there should be no concern that one party
is able to take unfair advantage of the other. Penn Ocean had
valid reasons for choosing the law of another state, which were
accepted by the other contracting party.
The choice of applicable law can make a big difference. For
example, different states have different statutes of limitations; 9
thus, the applicable law can determine whether suit may still be
brought depending on how much time has passed. Some states
allow arbitrators to award punitive damages, while others do
not. 10 Some states limit the amount of punitive damages that
9 New York's statute of limitations for contractual claims is six years, while
California's is four years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney 2003); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 337 (West 2003).
10 New York is in the minority of states in not allowing the award of punitive
damages by arbitrators. See Garrity v. Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 357-58, 353 N.E.2d
793, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1976); see also E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER &
STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND
BUSINESS 665 (1996).
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may be awarded in civil actions.1' Some states allow disclaimers
of implied warranties 12 and others do not.13 Therefore, the
governing law can be critical to the outcome of a claim.
The case for upholding the parties' choice of law would be
even stronger if Penn Ocean had bargained for the choice of
Massachusetts law by making some concession during the
contract negotiations. If an arbitrator were to refuse to enforce
the parties' choice of law as reflected in the contract, the
arbitrator would be upsetting the balance of the bargain made by
the parties.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF CHOICE-OF-LAW
CLAUSES IN ARBITRATION
The foregoing hypothetical illustrates some of the reasons
why commercial parties may choose a particular law to govern
their transaction. However, arbitrators and reviewing courts do
not always respect the parties' choice of law. This next section
briefly considers the evolution of judicial attitudes towards
arbitration in the United States generally and with respect to
choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements specifically over
the last century. It then briefly compares domestic practice to
accepted practices in international commercial arbitration.
A. The Evolution of Judicial Attitudes in the United States
Historically, there has been significant judicial resistance to
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution, largely
because it usurped the jurisdiction of the courts.' 4 Until well
11 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie
2000).
12 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(2); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1791.3, 1792.3 (West
2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(2) (West 2004); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
316(2) (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(2) (West 2004).
13 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-314-15
(1972), 11-7-18 (Supp. 2003).
14 J. STEWART MCCLENDON & ROSABEL E. EVERARD GOODMAN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 114 (1986); see also
Matter of Sprinzen, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976
(1979).
An agreement to submit to arbitration disputes arising out of a contract,
once condemned by the judiciary of this State as tending to oust the courts
of their jurisdiction and, thus, declared void as contrary to settled policy, is
now favorably recognized as an efficacious procedure whereby parties can
2005]
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into the twentieth century, "American courts regularly
invalidated arbitration agreements as an encroachment on the
judicial province and, hence, contrary to public policy."'15 With
the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925,16 this
attitude began to change. 17 Today, U.S. judges are usually quite
content to move cases off their dockets by enforcing arbitration
agreements.
Consistent with the judicial hostility towards arbitration
generally, U.S. courts were also skeptical of choice-of-law
clauses.18 According to one well-known legal commentator,
permitting parties to choose the law applicable to their
transactions "practically makes a legislative body of any two
persons who choose to get together and contract .... [, which is]
[s]o extraordinary a power in the hands of any two individuals
[that it] is absolutely anomalous."19
Over time, however, courts began to recognize the
importance of choice-of-law clauses in contracts and arbitration
agreements, 20 particularly in the international context. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
select their own nonjudicial forum for the "private and practical" resolution
of their disputes "with maximum dispatch and at minimum expense."
Id. (citations omitted).
15 MCCLENDON & GOODMAN, supra note 14, at 114.
16 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
17 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974), the U.S.
Supreme Court referred to the FAA as "reversing centuries of judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements." See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995) ("Congress passed the FAA 'to overcome courts' refusals to
enforce agreements to arbitrate."') (citation omitted).
18 See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550
(1935); Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY, Inc., 30 F.3d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 1994)
(refusing to enforce choice of English law in salvage contract between two U.S.
citizens because there was no reasonable relation to England); Curtis 1000, Inc. v.
Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to honor the parties' designation of
Delaware law due to insufficient connections between the contract and the State of
Delaware); United Counties Trust Co. v. Mac Lum, Inc., 643 F.2d 1140, 1143-44
(5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to enforce lease's designation of Georgia law where
transaction had no reasonable relation to that state); E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) (refusing to honor contractual choice of English
law where bill of lading was issued in Italy); see also MCCLENDON & GOODMAN,
supra note 14, at 114-15; Friedler, supra note 2, at 477.
19 Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L.
REV. 260, 260-61 (1910).
20 See, e.g., Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 632, 389 N.E.2d 456, 460, 415
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (1979).
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[I]n the absence of the arbitration provision considerable
uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still
exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of
disputes arising out of the contract.
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to
any contract touching two or more countries, each with its own
substantive laws and conflicts-of-laws rules. A contractual
provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the
orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates
the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties
or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
21
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized many of the
advantages that accrue from a contractual choice-of-law clause:
certainty, predictability, and avoidance of a hostile forum.
22
Because of these advantages, the American judiciary now
generally accepts that parties are free to choose the law that will
govern their transactions, albeit with certain limitations.23 Part
IV of this article provides a fuller explanation of the current
state of the law with respect to the limitations that exist on the
parties' choice of applicable law.
21 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 (footnotes omitted); see also Northrop Corp. v. Triad
Int'l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir. 1987).
22 See LEW, supra note 2, at 79-80 (explaining in detail the importance of
certainty, predictability, and uniformity in international commercial arbitration).
23 See Friedler, supra note 2, at 478. For examples of federal court cases
enforcing choice-of-law clauses in commercial contracts, see Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767-
68 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Northrop Corp., 811 F.2d at 1265, 1267-69; Medimatch, Inc. v.
Lucent Techs. Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 842, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2000). According to a recent
study of 697 cases involving choice-of-law clauses done by Professor Ribstein, courts
enforced the choice-of-law clauses in approximately 85% of the cases. See Larry E.
Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV.
363, 374-75 (2003). Professor Ribstein noted that "these totals do not include cases
dealing only with choice of forum and arbitration, which raise distinct issues." Id. at
375 n.38.
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B. Freedom to Choose the Applicable Law in International
Commercial Arbitration versus Domestic Commercial
Arbitration
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company involved an international
arbitration, 24 a context in which acceptance of the -parties'
freedom to choose the applicable law is particularly well
established. 25  In fact, many international arbitration rules
expressly state that the parties are free to choose the law to be
applied to their agreement and that their choice is to be
respected by the arbitrator(s). 26 One of the primary incentives
for parties to agree to arbitration in the international business
context is to avoid being subjected to a potentially hostile foreign
forum and an unfamiliar legal system. 27
Just as in the international context, significant advantages
can be gained through a choice-of-law clause in a domestic
commercial transaction. Different states' laws may vary
significantly and may be unfamiliar to one or more of the
parties. 2s Some states' laws may be considered more business
friendly. 29 Some states may have a more developed system of
24 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
25 See, e.g., RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 23 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 2000); LEW, supra note 2,
at 71-72, 582; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 94-95 (3d ed., London, Sweet and
Maxwell 1999); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 137 (1992).
26 UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES art. 33.1 (1976) ("The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.");
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. 17.1 (1998)
("The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the
Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute."); AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, 2000, at 28 (2000) ("The
tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law designated by the parties
as applicable to the dispute."); ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES art. 24 (1999); NETHERLANDS ARBITRATION
INSTITUTE, ARBITRATION RULES art. 45 (2001). However, most domestic arbitration
rules are silent on the issue.
27 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 25, at 99; Rachel Engle, Note, Party
Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to
Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 323, 324 (Spring 2002).
28 For an example, see supra Part I.
29 For example, Delaware is known for its well-developed corporation law. See
William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era
of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 698-700 (2001) (discussing different
states' laws that are designed to attract different businesses and persons).
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law in certain areas. 30 Just as in international arbitration, some
parties may want a neutral law to apply. Certain states also
may not be geographically convenient for one or more of the
parties, as some are farther away from one another than many
foreign countries are from each other. 31 For these reasons, it is
useful for parties to a commercial transaction to be able to select
the law that will apply to any dispute that may arise between
them.
III. LEGAL AND POLICY REASONS SUPPORTING RESPECT FOR THE
PARTIES' CHOICE OF LAW IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Although arbitration has some public law components,
32
arbitration is essentially a creature of contract. 33 Arbitration
would not occur but for the agreement of the parties to submit
certain disputes to the arbitrator(s) for resolution. 34 As a result,
an arbitrator's authority to hear and decide disputes is both
30 For example, New York is renowned in legal circles for its well-developed
body of maritime law, whereas Kansas, being landlocked, would not be expected to
have a well-developed body of law in this area.
31 See Woodward, supra note 29, at 699-700.
32 For example, in the United States, enforceability of arbitration agreements
and awards is made possible though the FAA, which is a federal statute. See 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
33 Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 201, 647
N.E.2d 1308, 1312, 623 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804 (1995) (stating "arbitration is manifestly
a matter of contract"); Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Arbitration is, however, a matter of contract, and the contours of the
arbitrator's authority in a given case are determined by reference to the arbitral
agreement."); see also STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER,
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1998); REISMAN, supra note 25, at 6. The
jurisdictional theory of arbitration posits that arbitration is not so different from
litigation because the validity of the arbitration agreement and the enforcement of
the award depend on the law of the enforcing state. See LEW, supra note 2, at 52-54.
However, this theory was largely followed in socialist countries and does not
represent the prevailing view today. See id. at 54-61. Other scholars suggest a
mixed theory of arbitration recognizing that arbitration contains elements of both
public and private law. See id. at 57-58. Under this theory, the parties' agreement,
including their choice of law, is respected unless it is contrary to the public policy of
the forum. See id. at 58; see also Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an
International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16
INT'L LAW. 613, 617-20 (1982) (summarizing various theories of arbitration and
party autonomy).
34 There may exist some forms of court-ordered "arbitration," but such
proceedings are not within the traditional definition of arbitration and are therefore
outside the scope of this article. For a traditional definition of arbitration, see supra
note 1.
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derived from, 35 and limited by, the arbitration agreement. 36
Arbitrators are not free to substitute their own view as to what
the parties "should have agreed to for what the parties actually
agreed to."37 Instead, the arbitrators are confined to interpreting
the parties' agreement, 38 and have no jurisdiction to decide
issues that are not within the agreement's scope. 39 Although
arbitrators' opinions are typically neither required to be written
nor reasoned40 and are rarely overturned,41 should they go
35 Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is
well-settled that the arbitrator's jurisdiction is defined by both the contract
containing the arbitration clause and the submission agreement."); Szuts v. Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir. 1991) ('The power and authority
of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions of the
arbitration agreement under which the arbitrators were appointed."); see also LEW,
supra note 2, at 83; REISMAN, supra note 25, at 6.
36 Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co.,
621 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D.D.C. 1985) ("An arbitrator's authority is confined to
interpreting and applying the collective bargaining a reement, and he may not
'dispense his own brand of industrial justice' by substituting his view of what the
parties to an agreement should have agreed to for what they parties actually agreed
to." (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960))); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d
649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A]rbitrators are restricted to those issues
submitted.... Arbitration is contractual and arbitrators derive their authority from
the scope of the contractual agreement.").
37 Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 621 F. Supp. at 1002. Various
international arbitral rules recognize this principle, requiring that arbitrators make
their decisions in accordance with the terms of the contract. See, e.g., UNITED
NATIONS, COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 26, at art. 33.3(1976) ("In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract .... ); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 26, at
art. 17.2 (1988) ("In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the
provisions of the contract...."); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note
26, at art. 28.2 (2000) ("In arbitrations involving the application of contracts, the
tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract .... ); CHINA
CHAMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION (CIETAC) ARBITRATION RULES art. 53 (2000)
('The arbitration tribunal shall independently and impartially make its arbitral
award on the basis of facts, in accordance with the law and the terms of the
contracts, with reference to international practices and in compliance with the
principle of fairness and reasonableness.").
38 Coast Trading Co. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1982).
But see Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 86 N.Y.2d 146, 155, 654
N.E.2d 95, 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279 (1995) (stating that an arbitral award would
not be vacated, even if the arbitrator "disregards the plain words of the parties'
agreement, . . . 'unless the court concludes that [the award] is totally irrational or
violative of a strong public policy"').
39 Tatibouet v. Ellsworth, 54 P.3d 397, 406 (Haw. 2002).
40 See DOMKE, supra note 1, § 34:6.
41 Id. § 38:1.
[Vol.79:59
2005] THE ARBITRATORS' DUTY
beyond the scope of the written agreement, their awards may
become vulnerable to the court's scrutiny.42  For example,
arbitrators may not award remedies that are not permitted by
the arbitration agreement. 43 In light of the contractual nature of
arbitration, parties to a commercial arbitration agreement ought
to be assured that their choice of the applicable law will be
respected as well.
The contractual nature of arbitration serves to distinguish it
from litigation. 44 Unlike judges, who are appointed or elected by
law, arbitrators are appointed by the private agreement of the
parties, and their allegiance should be to seeing that the terms of
that private agreement are carried out.45 The arbitrator's duty
to respect the wishes of the parties as expressed in their written
agreement extends to respect for the parties' choice of law in a
commercial transaction.46
42 See Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255,
262 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA') permits vacatur of an
arbitral award where the arbitrators 'exceeded their powers."') (quoting 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(4)); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330 (1st Cir. 2000)
("Section 10 of the FAA lists the circumstances in which a court has the authority to
vacate an award, including certain types of misconduct by the arbitrator or where
the arbitrator 'exceeded [his] powers."') (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)) (alteration in
original); Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[A]n
arbitral award regarding a matter not within the scope of the governing arbitration
clause is one made in excess of authority, and a court is precluded from giving effect
to such an award."); see also HUBER & TRACHTE-HUBER, supra note 33, at 488.
43 See Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 343 F.3d. 401, 410
(5th Cir. 2003); Coast Trading, 681 F.2d at 1198.
44 Arbitration differs from litigation in a number of other ways. For example, in
arbitration, parties may choose where to arbitrate and who the decision-makers will
be. By contrast, rules regarding proper subject matter, personal jurisdiction and
venue dictate where lawsuits may be brought; court rules and practices dictate the
assignment of the presiding judge. See OEHMKE, supra note 1, § 1:5 (stating that
arbitrators are "not bound by the formal rules of procedure or evidence").
45 As two respected scholars of international arbitration put it:
[Unlike national courts, amn international arbitral tribunal does not owe
allegiance to a particular national system of law. Its appointment is not
due to the state, but to the agreement of the parties; and in applying the
law chosen by the parties, an arbitral tribunal is simply carrying out their
agreement.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 25, at 95; see also LEW, supra note 2, at 81, 535.
46 Am. Eagle Airlines, 343 F.3d. at 406 (stating "an 'arbitrator may not ignore
the plain language of the contract"') (quoting United Paperworks Int'l. Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)); Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie,
85 N.Y.2d 193, 200-01, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1312, 623 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804 (1995); see
also DOMKE, supra note 1, § 30:4; OEHMKE, supra note 1, § 3:17.
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The FAA recognizes the private contractual nature of
arbitration, as it provides a right to obtain an order directing
that "arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the
arbitration] agreement. ' 47  Construing this language, the
Supreme Court has held that "the federal policy is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate."48 This policy of enforcing agreements
according to their terms includes the parties' choice of governing
law. 49 As a result, parties are free "to include a choice of law
provision in their agreement, and the parties' choice will be
honored unless the chosen law creates a conflict with the terms
of, or policies underlying, the FAA."50
If arbitrators routinely respect the parties' choices as
reflected in the arbitration agreement, more parties will be
encouraged to use arbitration as an alternative method of
dispute settlement because the parties will know that they can
control the process and gain many of the advantages of
arbitration. These advantages include both public and private
benefits, such as facilitating commerce by resolving disputes
more quickly and efficiently than through litigation; 51 freeing up
court dockets, thereby saving public resources; and promoting
more efficient regulation of cross-border activity, thereby
maximizing human welfare.5 2 For these reasons, public policy
should encourage parties to use arbitration as a method of
dispute settlement. If, however, arbitrators do not respect the
47 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000); see also Smith Barney, 85 N.Y.2d at 201, 647 N.E.2d at
1312, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)).
48 Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
49 See id. at 479; Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 86 N.Y.2d 146,
154, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279 (1995). As one scholar states, "An
arbitrator would frustrate the expectations of the parties were he to disregard their
choice [of law]." Croff, supra note 33, at 622.
50 Smith Barney, 85 N.Y.2d at 201, 647 N.E.2d at 1312, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 804
(citation omitted); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 57 (1995) (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). The FAA "declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum
for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Thus, the FAA will
preempt state law to the extent that state law conflicts with the FAA. See Volt, 489
U.S. at 477; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987).
51 See, e.g., Howard M. Holtzmann, Arbitration: An Indispensable Aid to
Multinational Enterprise, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 337, 337 (1975).
52 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883,
884, 914-15 (2002); Ribstein, supra note 23, at 366.
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parties' choices, many of the advantages associated with
arbitration will cease to exist because the manner in which the
arbitration will proceed will become less certain and
predictable. 53
Absent overriding public policy considerations, 54 reviewing
courts also should respect party autonomy pursuant to two well-
established doctrines. First, respecting party autonomy in
arbitration furthers the federal policy in favor of arbitration as
reflected in the FAA. 55 As stated above, the FAA creates the
right to have the arbitration proceed in accordance with the
parties' wishes.56 If the parties know that courts will uphold
arbitration awards that are made in accordance with the parties'
wishes, the parties will be even more likely to resort to
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.
Routine respect for the parties' agreement makes the process
more certain and predictable, thus allowing business persons to
better plan their business and legal dealings and relationships.
5 7
53 From a business perspective, arbitrators will usually want to respect the
choices made by the parties in order to have satisfied customers who will then be
more likely to use those arbitrators again in the future. See Lawrence W. Newman
& David Zaslowsky, Cultural Predictability in International Arbitration, N.Y. L.J.,
May 25, 2004, at 3 (stating that if arbitrators do not follow the parties' agreement,
the arbitrators can be terminated).
54 See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of public policy considerations in this
area.
55 Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 ("[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.") (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); Smith Barney, 85 N.Y.2d at
200-01, 647 N.E.2d at 1312, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
In enacting the FAA, Congress established a Federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, which is to be advanced by rigorous judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements and by resolution of any
"ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself in favor of
arbitration."
.... [T]he policy established by the FAA is to ensure that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Accordingly,
the parties are at liberty to include a choice of law provision in their
agreement, and the parties' choice will be honored unless the chosen law
creates a conflict with the terms of, or policies underlying, the FAA.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
56 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
57 See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 247-55.
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Second, respecting the agreement of the parties is consistent
with the general policy favoring freedom of contract. 58 When
courts are deciding disputes arising out of contractual
relationships, the intent of the parties is generally controlling.
Likewise, an arbitral tribunal is bound to effectuate the intent of
the parties.59 These same principles should be applied to require
enforcement of contractual provisions reflecting the choice of law
made by the parties. Thus, if a court is reviewing an arbitral
award where the arbitrators have failed to respect the parties'
choice of law, the court should vacate that award because the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers. 60
IV. WHAT CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES GOVERN COURTS AND WHY
Do THEY MATTER FOR ARBITRATION?
Despite the sound legal and policy reasons for party
autonomy, in the author's experience there have been limited
occasions when one party became dissatisfied with the choice of
law made by the parties to the arbitration agreement and sought
to have that choice nullified by the arbitrators. 61 In such cases,
58 See Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("Under American law, contractual choice-of-law provisions are usually honored.")
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 (1971)); see also
Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
59 Deprenyl Animal Health v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d
1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
60 The FAA provides that one of the grounds for vacation of an arbitral award is
"[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Despite this
language, at least one scholar, Thomas Carbonneau, suggested that arbitrators
have certain inherent authority implied by their designation as arbitrators to
manage and conduct the proceedings and that this authority may include the power
to overrule the parties' choice of law in the "best interests of the process." See
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 MIAMI L. REV.
773, 814, 820-21 (2002). He argued that in choosing arbitration, the parties
bargained for a "workable process" in exchange for placing "enormous authority and
trust in the arbitrator." Id. at 815. While it is true that arbitrators are vested with
certain inherent authority to manage the arbitral process, this author believes that
the arbitrators' inherent authority is limited to matters that the parties have not
expressly agreed upon, i.e., to fill in gaps. Where the parties have expressly
bargained for and agreed upon a contractual term, the arbitrator lacks the power to
overrule the parties' agreement.
61 For example, a party may seek to undo the previous agreement as to the
applicable law where a dispute has arisen and the party discovers that the law
originally chosen is not favorable to that party's position in the particular dispute.
Unfortunately, because most arbitrations are private and arbitral awards are
generally not published, it is not possible to investigate and determine exactly how
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the party may argue that the choice-of-law clause in the
arbitration agreement is invalid because it lacks a reasonable or
substantial relationship to the parties or underlying transaction
under judicial conflict of laws rules.62 If the arbitral panel
agrees to examine the matter, it is likely to look to the law of the
forum or seat of arbitration to determine the appropriate result.
The arbitrators are likely to take this approach because, absent
a specific choice-of-law clause, the designation of the place of
arbitration traditionally has been treated as consent to the
procedural law of that place, and is often considered to be
persuasive evidence that local substantive law applies.
63
Another alternative would be for the arbitrators to apply the
conflict of laws rules that accompany the substantive law chosen
by the parties. However, where the challenge is to the
applicability of the chosen law, the arbitrators may be hesitant
to use that state's conflict of laws rules, and may instead turn to
the forum's rules to help it decide whether the choice of law
made by the parties is valid. This analysis assumes, of course,
that the law chosen by the parties is different from the law of the
forum. In any event, regardless of which state's law the
arbitrators apply, to the extent that the arbitrators apply any
state's conflict of laws rules in lieu of following the choice of law
originally made by the parties, a review of such rules is in order.
frequently this situation occurs. Julian Lew's treatise provides a few examples of
international commercial arbitrations in which the parties' choice of law was not
respected or was found to be an insufficient manifestation of the parties' intent. See
LEW, supra note 2, at 132-35. However, in general, Lew considers these examples to
be exceptions to the general rule in favor of party autonomy in international
commercial arbitration. See id. at 132. Another scholar, Corinne Truong, also
suggests that parties rarely object to the application of a law to which they had
previously consented. Cam Quyen Corinne Truong, The Law Applicable to the
Merits in International Distribution Contracts: An Analysis of ICC Arbitral Awards,
12 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 37 (Spring 2001).
62 According to Ribstein's study: "Courts rarely enforce choice-of-law clauses
when enforcement is contested without some connection between the parties or the
transaction and the designated state." Ribstein, supra note 23, at 376.
63 See DOMKE, supra note 1, § 30:3; OEHMKE, supra note 1, § 48:27. Although
applying the conflict of laws rules of the seat of arbitration is the traditional
approach, some scholars suggest that more modern practice includes a
determination of the proper law of the contract based on the contacts between the
parties and the transaction and the various legal systems. See Julian D.M. Lew,
Relevance of Conflict of Law Rules in the Practice of Arbitration, in PLANNING
EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 447, 453-55 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 1996).
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A. The General Rule in Favor of Party Autonomy
The general rule in the United States is that parties are free
to choose the law applicable to their disputes and that
agreement will be honored.64 As one court stated:
Where two commercial concerns enter into a major contract
(not one of adhesion, but representing at least substantially
equal bargaining power), no reason would appear to compel the
disregard of their arms-length bargain that a particular law
applied to their agreements .... Why should such parties not
have the right to define their own legal standards, and to look
to a court to honor that choice if one of the parties breaks its
promise?65
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law ("Restatement")
provides the following rationale for the general rule in favor of
freedom of choice:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified
expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them to
foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities
under the contract. These objectives may best be attained in
multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the law to
govern the validity of the contract and the rights created
thereby. In this way, certainty and predictability of result are
most likely to be secured. Giving parties this power of choice is
also consistent with the fact that, in contrast to other areas of
the law, persons are free within broad limits to determine the
nature of their contractual obligations. 66
As demonstrated below, the rule in favor of party autonomy
is reflected in numerous legal sources-including the
Restatement as already mentioned, the Uniform Commercial
Code, various state statutes, and state and federal case law.
However, there are also significant limitations on the rule.
64 Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Medimatch, Inc. v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 842, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see
also Friedler, supra note 2, at 478.
65 See Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1350, 1351
(N.D. Ill. 1984). This case dealt with a choice of law involving the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which itself expressly recognized the parties' freedom to
choose the applicable law in UCC § 1-105, provided that the law chosen bears a
reasonable or appropriate relationship to the transaction. Id.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971).
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B. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
Section 186 of the Restatement provides that the starting
point for any choice of law analysis is the law chosen by the
parties: "Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by
the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and otherwise by
the law selected in accordance with the rule of § 188."67 Section
187 reaffirms the general rule set forth in § 186,68 but creates
certain exceptions to the general rule. 69 The § 187(2) exceptions
essentially create three hurdles that must be overcome.
70
First, the party challenging the applicability of the chosen
law must demonstrate that there is no substantial relationship
between the law chosen and either the parties or the contract
itself.71 With respect to this first hurdle, it would seem fairly
obvious that the law of a state that has a substantial
relationship to the parties or the contract could be applied since
that state's law could apply in the absence of any choice by the
parties.
Second, the challenging party must demonstrate that there
is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice of law. 72 Since
most businesspersons are presumed to behave in a rational
manner to maximize profit, it is sensible to assume that there is
67 Id. § 186.
68 Id. § 187(1) ("The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the
parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue."). Examples of issues that the parties cannot resolve by agreement
include "capacity, formalities and substantial validity." See id. § 187 cmt. d.
69 See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 262 (suggesting that the general rule in favor
of party autonomy is "seriously weakened" by these exceptions).
70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2).
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which
the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
Id.
71 Id. § 187(2)(a).
72 Id.
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a reasonable basis for the law chosen by the parties.7 3 Thus, as
one commentator suggested: "It is not clear why any choice the
parties mutually agree to is not prima facie 'reasonable."' 74 Of
course, if the chosen state's law has some substantial
relationship to the parties or the contract, the parties will be
held to have made a reasonable choice.7 5
The more difficult question arises where there is little or no
connection between the parties to the contract and the law that
is chosen. In such cases, how does one demonstrate that the
parties were reasonable in choosing some other law to govern?
Parties to an international business transaction may agree upon
the law of a third neutral country rather than the law of one of
their home countries to avoid either party gaining the advantage
of having its own familiar law apply. The commentary to the
Restatement also provides another possible answer. It suggests
that parties contracting in a legal system that is foreign or
immature may choose a law that is better known and developed
and therefore will provide more certainty with respect to their
contractual rights and duties.76  This possible answer may
explain a choice of a particular country's law in the international
context, but may be less helpful in the domestic context when
parties are choosing between the laws of various states in the
United States, all of which have reasonably well-known and
developed legal systems. However, even within the United
States, some states may have a more well-developed body of law
than other states in a particular area. Examples of this include
Delaware's corporation law and New York's maritime law. Thus,
even in a domestic context, parties may wish to choose a
particular state's law over another state's law because one
system is more familiar and mature than the other.
The third hurdle to overcome is the potential conflict with "a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state."77  Difficulties here include
defining when another state has a "materially greater interest"
in the transaction and defining what types of public policy are
73 "Contracts are entered into for serious purposes and rarely, if ever, will the
parties choose a law without good reason for doing so." Id. § 187 cmt. f.
74 Ribstein, supra note 8, at 264.
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f.; see also
Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 595 F. Supp. 918, 923 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f.
77 Id. § 187(2)(b).
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considered so "fundamental" that they should override the rule
in favor of party autonomy.78
Despite the Restatement's apparent general approval of
party autonomy, the above-described exceptions sometimes have
been interpreted by courts so as to substantially limit the
parties' freedom to choose the governing law.79 As suggested
above, courts have not treated any choice of law as reasonable
within the meaning of § 187(2)(a); rather, they have usually
looked for some relationship between the law chosen and the
parties to the transaction. In addition, courts have used
subsection (b) of § 187(2) to invalidate choice-of-law clauses
where another state's public policy is implicated.80 As a result,
there are a number of cases in which the parties' choice of law
was not upheld.81
Ironically, if the arbitrators disregard the parties' choice of
law, it is even less likely that a court will overturn that decision
in an action seeking to vacate the award. Because there is a
strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitration awards,8 2 judicial
review of such awards is extremely limited8 3 and courts will
78 For examples of courts that have struggled with these issues, see Morgan
Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 693 F. Supp. 1479, 1494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Comerio, 595 F. Supp. at 921.
79 As one commentator has stated, some "American courts seem to pay only lip
service to party autonomy." Friedler, supra note 2, at 478.
80 Ribstein's study suggests that nonenforcement of choice-of-law clauses is
most common in two particular categories of cases: noncompetition clauses in
employment agreements and franchise agreements. Ribstein, supra note 23, at 376.
81 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. A complete survey of the relevant
case law is beyond the scope of this article. The intent here is to show that
commercial parties' choice of law is not always respected despite the general rule in
favor of party autonomy.
82 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (2000); see also supra notes 50, 55 and accompanying
text.
83 Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 260
(2d Cir. 2003) ("The scope of the district court's review of an arbitral award is
limited."); Teamsters Local Union No. 61 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 600,
604 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating "judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely
limited") (quoting Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178
(D.C. Cir. 1991)); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330 (1st Cir.
2000) (noting that judicial review of an arbitration award is 'extremely narrow and
exceedingly deferential."') (quoting Wheelabrator Envirotech Operating Servs. Inc.
v. Mass. Laborers Dist. Council Local 1144, 88 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1996)); Coastal
Oil of New England, Inc. v. Teamsters Local A/W, 134 F.3d 466, 469 (1st Cir. 1998)
('[J]udicial review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest known to the
law."') (quoting Maine Cent. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 873 F.2d
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sometimes enforce awards even where the arbitrators' have
ignored the rule in favor of party autonomy.8 4 In some cases,
courts have refused to vacate arbitral awards as representing an
excess of authority8 5 despite the fact that the arbitrators ignored
the parties' choice-of-law clause, unless there was a violation of
public policy or a decision that is "totally irrational."8 6  This
practice represents a blind application of the policy favoring the
enforceability of arbitral awards, without consideration of the
equally valuable competing policies in favor of freedom of
contract and party autonomy in arbitration. Where an
arbitrator's actions are contrary to express contractual
provisions, such actions should not be respected on judicial
review8 7 absent an overriding and fundamental public policy
concern.
88
C. Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") also has long
contained a presumption favoring the ability of commercial
parties to choose the law applicable to their transaction.8 9
Section 1-105 of the UCC permits the parties to designate the
law applicable to their transaction subject to the limitation that
425, 428 (1st Cir. 1989)); Executone Info. Systems, Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320
(5th Cir. 1994) ("Our review of the arbitrator's award itself... is very deferential.").
84 See Engle, supra note 27, at 325 ("[M]ost national courts defer to the
arbitrators' rulings on the subject [of choice of law].") (citing Gary B. Born, Choices
of Law in International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 98, 99-100 (1994)).
85 Despite the limited scope of judicial review, courts retain the power to vacate
an arbitral award where the arbitrator has exceeded his powers under 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(4). See Bull, 229 F.3d at 330.
86 Revson v. Hack, 239 A.D.2d 169, 169, 657 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1997); see also
Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 86 N.Y.2d 146, 155, 654 N.E.2d 95,
100, 630 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279 (1995); Silverman v. Cooper, 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308, 461
N.E.2d 1261, 1266, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 779 (1984). A discussion of the extent of the
arbitrators' duty to take into account a state's public policy may be found in Part V,
infra.
87 McDonald v. Rodriguez, 184 B.R. 514, 517 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("Actions of an
arbitrator contrary to express contractual provisions will not be respected on
judicial review.").
88 See infra Part V.B.
89 With the exception of Louisiana, all states and the District of Columbia have
adopted some version of the UCC. See U.C.C. 1 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2003) (providing a
Table of Jurisdictions where the Code has been adopted.).
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there be a reasonable or appropriate relation between the state
whose law is chosen and the transaction. 90
The Official Comments to § 1-105 had reflected a somewhat
mixed view of the parties' true freedom in this regard. On the
one hand, the Official Comments stated that, "Ordinarily the law
chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur
or occurs."91 However, the Official Comments also appeared to
allow for exceptions to the requirement that there be reasonable
relation between the transaction and the law chosen. The
Comments stated that "an agreement as to choice of law may
sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of
the parties as to matters governed by their agreement, even
though the transaction has no significant contact with the
jurisdiction chosen."92
In 2001, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute approved
90 Section 1-105(1) of the UCC states:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this
Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2001). Subsection (2) contains additional limitations on the
parties' ability to choose the applicable law with respect to specific transactions that
may be governed by other Articles of the UCC. In this regard, the Official
Comments explained: "Especially in Article 9 parties taking a security interest or
asked to extend credit which may be subject to a security interest must have sure
ways to find out whether and where to file and where to look for possible existing
filings." Id. at cmt. 5.
91 Id. at cmt. 1.
92 Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
examined this language in the Intamin case. See Intamin, Inc. v. Figley Wright
Contractors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1984). This case involved a contract
dispute relating to the construction of a roller coaster in the state of Illinois. The
defendant argued that the parties could not agree to be governed by a substantive
body of law that did not bear an appropriate relationship to the underlying
transaction. Id. at 1351. The court rejected this argument, quoting the same
language from the Official Comments to the UCC quoted above and stating: "In
plain English that would permit the parties to apply the Illinois UCC even without
a 'reasonable relation' to their deal." Id. at 1352. Ultimately, however, the court did
not have to decide whether parties could choose a law that was entirely foreign to
the transaction to govern their relationship since there were contacts between the
transaction in that case and the state of Illinois. Id. Despite this fact, the Intamin
court's language provides support for the idea that parties may even choose a law
unrelated to their transaction to govern their dispute under the former UCC.
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Revised Article 1 of the UCC.93 Revised Article 1 significantly
changes the UCC's choice-of-law provision to expressly allow
parties to a domestic transaction to choose a state's law to
govern their transaction, regardless of whether the transaction
bears a relation to the state chosen.94 The Official Comments to
Revised Article 1 state that it "represents a significant
rethinking of choice of law issues" and "affords greater party
autonomy than former Section 1-105, but with important
safeguards protecting consumer interests and fundamental
policies .,95
With respect to this last comment, Revised Article 1
contains several important exceptions to the general rule
favoring party autonomy. First, parties to a domestic
transaction are only permitted to choose the law of a state of the
United States to govern their transaction, and are not allowed to
choose the law of a foreign country. 96 Domestic transactions are
defined as those that do not bear a reasonable relation to a
country other than the United States.97
Second, Revised Article 1 makes a distinction between
"consumer" transactions and "non-consumer transactions, such
as 'business to business' transactions."98 If a consumer is a party
93 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UCC
Article 1, General Provisions (2001), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformacts-
alphabetically.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
94 Revised Article 1 states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section: (1) an agreement by parties to
a domestic transaction that any or all of their rights and obligations are to
be determined by the law of this State or of another State is effective,
whether or not the transaction bears a relation to the State designated.
U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2002) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Revised Article 1].
Subsection (c)(2) provides for party autonomy with respect to international
transactions. Id. at (c)(2).
95 Id. at introductory cmt. The Official Comments also note in more than one
place that the change is intended to reflect "emerging international norms." See id.;
see also id. at cmt. 2.
96 See id. at § 1-301(c)(1); id. at cmt. 2, 4. If the underlying transaction bears a
reasonable relation to a foreign country, the parties may choose the law of any state
or foreign country to govern their transaction, regardless of whether there is any
relation between the transaction and the law chosen. Id § 1-301(c)(2). The Official
Comments explain this different treatment as follows: "The ability to designate the
law of any country in non-consumer international transactions is important in light
of the common practice in many commercial contexts of designating the law of a
'neutral' jurisdiction or of a jurisdiction whose law is well-developed." Id. at cmt. 5.
97 Id. § 1-301(a).
98 Id. at introductory cmt.
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to the transaction, the transaction must bear a reasonable
relation to the state or country whose law is chosen. 99
Additionally, application of the law must not deprive the
consumer of the benefit of laws enacted specifically for the
purposes of consumer protection. 100
The next exception provides that a choice of law will not be
effective to the extent that application of the chosen law would
contradict basic policies of the state or country whose law would
have applied in absence of the agreement. 10 1 The last exception
provides that the general choice of law rule found in § 1-301(c)(1)
is subject to the specific choice-of-law rules found in other
articles of the UCC, similar to the former UCC § 1-105(2).102
Since the approval and adoption of UCC Revised Article 1,
several states have introduced legislation to adopt it.103 Both
Virginia and Texas have enacted such legislation, but neither
chose to adopt the new rule regarding party autonomy contained
in Revised Article 1-301(c)(1). 10 4
UCC Revised Article 1 is an important step in the right
direction, but fails to go far enough in one respect. There is no
valid reason for refusing to permit parties to a domestic business
transaction to choose the law of a foreign country if they so
desire. Since consumer interests and fundamental policies of the
states are specifically protected, there is no basis to deny parties
to domestic commercial transactions even greater autonomy.
99 Id. § 1-301(e)(1).
100 Id. § 1-301(e)(2).
101 Id § 1-301(f). The Official Comments provide some guidance as to what
would constitute a "fundamental policy":
[A] court should not refrain from applying the designated law merely
because application of that law would lead to a result different than would
be obtained under the local law of the State or country whose law would
otherwise govern. Rather, the difference must be contrary to a public policy
of that jurisdiction that is so substantial that it justifies overriding the
concerns for certainty and predictability underlying modern commercial
law as well as concerns for judicial economy generally.
Id. § 1-301 cmt. 6. The comment continues by quoting an opinion of Judge Cardozo
from Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 108-11, 120 N.E. 198,
201-02 (1918).
102 U.C.C. § 1-301(g) (2002); see also supra note 90.
103 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws, A Few
Facts About the Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 1, General Provisions
(2001), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccuslluniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc l.
asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
104 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301 (Michie Supp. 2004); H.B. 1394, 78th Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2003).
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Using a variation on the hypothetical set forth at the
beginning of this article, assume that instead of a ship repair
contract, the underlying contract involves the purchase of
several hundreds of thousands of dollars of materials needed for
the ship repair. This change in the hypothetical would cause the
contract to fall within the provisions of the UCC because it now
involves the sale of goods. Assume further that Penn Ocean
solicits bids from manufacturers in the United States and
abroad, this time using a standard form contract that it used in a
previous transaction with an English supplier. This form
contract calls for the arbitration of any disputes under the laws
of the United Kingdom (U.K.).
Ultimately, Penn Ocean enters into a contract with a
Louisiana supplier, which will provide the necessary materials
at the appropriate times during the several weeks that the ship
is in the shipyard undergoing repair. Some materials will be
supplied from manufacturers in the United States and others
will be supplied from foreign manufacturers. Penn Ocean
decides the contract should retain the clause calling for the
application of U.K. law because England has well-developed
commercial and maritime law and is another common law
jurisdiction, as opposed to a civil law jurisdiction like Louisiana.
Negotiations ensue and the Louisiana supplier ultimately agrees
to this proposal.
Once again, why should these two commercial entities not be
allowed to choose a foreign law to govern their transaction if
they so desire? Both sides appear to have made an informed and
conscious choice and had the opportunity to consult legal
counsel. Thus, there should be no concern that one party is able
to take advantage of the other. Surely, the United States cannot
be so ethnocentric as to believe its legal system to be the best
and most developed in the world in every respect. If either the
states of Pennsylvania or Louisiana had a fundamental policy at
stake, that policy would already be protected by Revised Article
1-301(f). Therefore, there is no reason to limit even greater
party autonomy to only international transactions as Revised
Article 1-301(c)(1) currently does.
D. State Law
As previously mentioned, all fifty states, with the exception
of Louisiana, have adopted some form of the former UCC § 1-
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105.105 A handful of states, however, have modified the
traditional choice of law rules by adopting statutory provisions
that expressly permit parties to choose that state's or another
state's law to govern their transaction. This is true even though
there is no connection between the state chosen and the parties
or the underlying transaction under certain conditions. These
statutes are briefly described below.
10 6
New York was the first state to adopt such a provision. Its
law states that the parties to any contract worth at least
$250,000 "may agree that the law of this state shall govern their
rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not such
contract, agreement or uindertaking bears a reasonable relation to
this state."107  New York's law excludes any contracts: "(a) for
labor or personal services, (b) relating to any transaction for
personal, family or household services, or (c) to the extent
provided to the contrary in subsection two of section 1-105 of the
uniform commercial code."10
8
Illinois 09 and California110 have statutory provisions that
are similar to New York's. All three require that the underlying
105 See supra note 89.
106 See infra notes 109-24. State law in this area is changing rapidly. Therefore,
there may be other state statutes that grant greater party autonomy enacted
between the time this article is written and the time of publication.
107 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). This
statutory provision was originally enacted in 1984.
108 Id. § 5-1401(1).
109 The Illinois statute states:
The parties to any contract, agreement, or undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, in consideration of or relating to any obligation arising out of a
transaction covering in the aggregate not less than $250,000, including a
transaction otherwise covered by subsection (1) of Section 1-105 of the
Uniform Commercial Code [810 ILCS 5/1-105], may agree that the law of
this State shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in part, whether
or not the contract, agreement, or undertaking bears a reasonable relation
to this State. This Section shall not apply to any contract, agreement, or
undertaking (i) for labor or personal services, (ii) relating to any
transaction for personal, family, or household services, or (iii) to the extent
provided to the contrary in subsection (2) of Section 1-105 of the Uniform
Commercial Code [810 ILCS 5/1-105]. Nothing contained in this Section
shall be construed to limit or deny the enforcement of any provision
respecting choice of law in any other contract, agreement, or undertaking.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/5-5 (2003).
110 The California statute, in relevant part, states:
Notwithstanding Section 1646, the parties to any contract, agreement, or
undertaking, contingent or otherwise, relating to a transaction involving in
the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000),
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transaction be worth a minimum of $250,000, which makes it
reasonable to presume that the persons making the contractual
choice of law have at least a minimum level of sophistication
with business transactions.111  In addition, these statutory
provisions expressly exempt three categories of transactions:
contracts for labor or personal services; contracts for personal,
family or household services; and contracts which are excluded
from the general choice of law rule contained in UCC § 1-105.112
Delaware law also permits parties an increased amount of
freedom in choosing the law applicable to their contracts. The
parties may agree that the laws of Delaware will govern,
provided that the underlying written contract, agreement, or
transaction is worth at least $100,000 and provided that the
parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of, or
including a transaction otherwise covered by subdivision (1) of Section
1105 of the Commercial Code, may agree that the law of this state shall
govern their rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not the
contract, agreement, or undertaking or transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state. This section does not apply to any contract,
agreement, or undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating to
any transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, or
(c) to the extent provided to the contrary in subdivision (2) of Section 1105
of the Commercial Code.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (Deering 1994).
"I The legislative history and other background material relating to the New
York statute support this presumption. For example, a report by the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Comparative Law states:
By including only large non-consumer transactions, the proposal reduces
the likelihood that any party agreed to a governing law through fraud,
mistake, overreaching or unequal bargaining power. It also is probable
that the parties to a sizable commercial transaction will have been
represented by counsel during the negotiation process. These factors
guarantee, as much as possible, that the parties focused on the choice-of-
law provision and carefully considered the consequences of their choice of
New York law.
Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Proposal for Mandatory Enforcement
of Governing-Law Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial
Agreements, 38 REC. ASS'N. BAR CITY OF N.Y. 537, 543 (1983).
112 Contracts excluded from the general choice of law rule of UCC § 1-105 are
those that are governed by particular choice of law rules contained in other sections
of the UCC, namely UCC §§ 2-402 (rights of creditors against sold goods), 2A-105-
06 (leases), 4-102 (bank deposits and collections), 4A-507 (funds transfers), 5-116
(letters of credit), 6-103 (bulk sales), 8-110 (investment securities), and 9-103
(secured transactions). U.C.C. § 1-105 (2). Many state statutes recognize these
exclusions in their own choice of law provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5
(Deering 1994); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5.5 (West 2004); N.Y. GEN OBLIG.
LAW § 5-1401 (1) (McKinney 2001).
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arbitration in, Delaware so that they may be served with legal
process. 113
Texas likewise provides a significant degree of party
autonomy with respect to choice of law, but its statute is more
restrictive in that it only applies to "qualified transaction[s,]"
defined as transactions involving at least $1,000,000.114 On the
other hand, Texas law provides greater respect for party
autonomy by allowing fundamental or public policy to be
overridden by the parties' choice, but only if the transaction
bears a reasonable relation to the jurisdiction chosen. 115
The Florida legislature appears to have attempted to follow
in New York's footsteps, but it has placed so many limitations on
its choice-of-law statute that it may not change the general rule
113 The relevant portion of the Delaware statute states:
The parties to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement or other
undertaking shall be governed by or construed under the laws of this
State, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of
this State shall govern, in whole or in part, any or all of their rights,
remedies, liabilities, powers and duties if the parties, either as provided by
law or in the manner specified in such writing are, (i) subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be
served with legal process. The foregoing shall conclusively be presumed to
be a significant, material and reasonable relationship with this State and
shall be enforced whether or not there are other relationships with this
State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708(a) (2002). For further explanation of the Delaware
statute, see Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law,
19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999, 1003-04 (1994).
114 Subject to certain limited exemptions, Texas law provides that, for
transactions, contracts, or agreements worth at least $1,000,000:
[I]f the parties to a qualified transaction agree in writing that the law of a
particular jurisdiction governs the interpretation or construction of an
agreement relating to the transaction or a provision of the agreement, the
law, other than the conflict of laws rules, of that jurisdiction governs that
issue regardless of whether the transaction bears a reasonable relation to
that jurisdiction.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.5 1(a)(2) & (c) (Vernon 2002).
115 Subsection (b) of § 35.51 of the Texas statute provides that:
[I]f the parties to a qualified transaction agree in writing that the law of a
particular jurisdiction governs an issue relating to the transaction,
including the validity or enforceability of an agreement relating to the
transaction or a provision of the agreement, and the transaction bears a
reasonable relation to that jurisdiction, the law, other than conflict of laws
rules, of that jurisdiction governs the issue regardless of whether the
application of that law is contrary to a fundamental or public policy of this
state or of any other jurisdiction.
Id. § 35.51(b).
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for many transactions. 116 Other states that have enacted choice-
of-law statutes recognizing some form of party autonomy include
Alabama, 117 Ohio, 118 Oregon,119 and Louisiana. 120
116 The Florida choice-of-law statute states in relevant part:
(1) The parties to any contract, agreement, or undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, in consideration of or relating to any obligation arising out of a
transaction involving in the aggregate not less than $250,000, the
equivalent thereof in any foreign currency, or services or tangible or
intangible property, or both, of equivalent value, including a transaction
otherwise covered by s. 671.105(1), may, to the extent permitted under the
United States Constitution, agree that the law of this state will govern
such contract, agreement, or undertaking, the effect thereof and their
rights and duties thereunder, in whole or in part, whether or not such
contract, agreement, or undertaking bears any relation to this state.
(2) This section does not apply to any contract, agreement, or undertaking:
(a) Regarding any transaction which does not bear a substantial or
reasonable relation to this state in which every party is either or a
combination of:
1. A resident and citizen of the United States, but not of this
state; or
2. Incorporated or organized under the laws of another state and
does not maintain a place of business in this state;
(b) For labor or employment;
(c) Relating to any transaction for personal, family, or household
purposes, unless such contract, agreement, or undertaking concerns a
trust at least one trustee of which resides or transacts business as a
trustee in this state, in which case this section applies;
(d) To the extent provided to the contrary in s. 671.105(2); or
(e) To the extent such contract, agreement, or undertaking is
otherwise covered or affected by s. 655.55.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2003). Section 655.55 deals with the "[l]aw
applicable to deposits in and contracts relating to extensions of credit by a deposit or
lending institution located in [Florida]." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.55 (West 2004).
117 Alabama law only permits parties to transactions involving funds transfers
to select the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern their transaction, whether or
not the payment order or the funds transfer bears a reasonable relation to thatjurisdiction. See ALA. CODE § 7-4A-507 (2003). Interestingly, this statutory
provision is not limited to permitting parties to choose Alabama law even if
Alabama law is unconnected to the funds transfer. Parties may choose any law they
wish. Alabama's statute also has no minimum dollar amount that must be met for
the transaction to qualify. The official comment to Alabama's statute explains this
freedom of choice:
Subsection (b) deals with choice-of-law agreements and it gives maximum
freedom of choice. Since the law of funds transfers is not highly developed
in the case law there may be a strong incentive to choose the law of ajurisdiction in which Article 4A is in effect because it provides a greater
degree of certainty with respect to the rights of various parties.
Id. § 7-4A-507 cmt.3. Several provisions of the U.C.C. also contain very permissive
choice-of-law rules for certain financial transactions. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-507(b) (funds
transfers), 5-116(a) (letters of credit), 8-110(d) (securities) (2003).
118 The Ohio statute provides in relevant part:
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The legislative history of New York's choice-of-law statute
provides some indication as to why some states are leaning
towards greater party autonomy. New York's expressed purpose
in enacting its choice-of-law provision was to 'secure and
augment its reputation as a center of international
commerce."' 121 The legislative history underlying the statute is
replete with statements indicating a concern that, without this
provision, New York's status as a major financial and
commercial capitol could be eroded. This concern is grounded in
the legislature's uncertainty as to whether contracts choosing
New York law would be enforceable in New York courts.
122
(A) Except as provided in division (C) of this section, any person may bring
a civil action in a court of this state against an individual, corporation, or
other person who is a resident of, incorporated under the laws of, or
otherwise engaged in the conduct of business in a foreign nation or a
province, territory, or other political subdivision of a foreign nation,
against a foreign nation, or against a province, territory, or other political
subdivision of a foreign nation upon a cause of action that arises out of or
relates to a contingent or other contract, agreement, or undertaking,
whether or not it bears a reasonable relation to this state, if the contract,
agreement, or undertaking contains both of the following provisions:
(1) An agreement by the parties to be governed in their rights and
duties under the contract, agreement, or undertaking, in whole or in
part, by the law of this state;
(2) An agreement by the parties to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.39 (Anderson 2001). Because this choice-of-law
provision is contained in Ohio's long-arm statute and only applies to suits brought
in Ohio courts, it would not apply to agreements to arbitrate, unless perhaps if one
party to the agreement sought enforcement of the arbitration agreement or the
award in court.
119 The Oregon statute provides in relevant part that, "Except as specifically
provided by ORS 81.105, 81.110, 81.112, 81.115 or 81.125, the contractual rights
and duties of the parties are governed by the law or laws that the parties have
chosen. The choice of law may extend to the entire contract or to part of a contract."
OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120 (2003). The statute makes several exceptions, excluding
contracts for real property, personal services, franchises, licensing, and agency,
among others. See id. § 81.135; see also id. §§ 81.105, 81.110, 81.112, 81.115, 81.125.
120 The Louisiana statute contains the general rule that "[aIll other issues of
conventional obligations are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied
upon by the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of
the state whose law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537." LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 3540 (West 1994). However, there are several exceptions. See, e.g.,
id. arts. 14, 3515, 3537.
121 Radioactive, J.V. v. Manson, 153 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals
Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
122 Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York Ch. 421,
1984 N.Y. Laws 3288; Memorandum of Sen. John J. Marchi and Assemblyman
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Proponents of the bill recognized that the law would result in
more cases on New York courts' already crowded dockets, but
nevertheless argued that "the number of multi-jurisdiction
contracts which actually result in litigation is a tiny fraction of
all such contracts," and that "the professional and economic
benefits to be gained from fostering New York's status as a world
financial and legal capital [sic] outweigh the risk of some slight
increase in the case load of New York courts."123 Other states
have similarly recognized the potential economic benefit of such
statutes.124
As the above survey demonstrates, a few states have taken
steps towards allowing parties to select the law of a state to
govern their transaction, even where there is no relation
between the parties or the transaction and the state whose law is
chosen. In each such case, the state has placed limitations upon
the parties' ability to select the law of an unrelated jurisdiction.
These limitations are designed to ensure that only parties to
relatively large commercial transactions-often worth a certain
minimum dollar amount between $100,000 and $1,000,000-will
qualify. Limitations such as those found in New York's statute
are therefore appropriate because they alleviate concerns that
consumers or unsophisticated businesspersons might be forced to
litigate or arbitrate under unfair or unfamiliar circumstances.
However, when two businesspersons or entities are involved and
a reasonably large amount of money is at stake, it is fair to
assume that they have access to legal counsel, that they will
read any contract they sign, and that they will be knowingly and
consciously agreeing to the arbitration and to the choice of law
Stegel, Bill Jacket, ch 421, L. 1984, at 1-2; Letter from Assemblyman Mark Alan
Siegel to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel to the Governor, dated Jul. 24, 1984, Bill Jacket,
L. 1984, ch 421; Letter of Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, dated
July 10, 1984, Bill Jacket, L. 1984, ch 421; Letter from James P. Murphy, Executive
Vice President of the New York Bankers' Association, to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel
to the Governor, dated July 11, 1984, Bill Jacket, L. 1984, ch. 421.
123 Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, supra note 111, at 550; see
also Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York, supra note
122, at 3289; Memorandum of Sen. John J. Marchi and Assemblyman Stegel, supra
note 122. These legislators also suggest that the law could result in "off-setting
efficiencies-for example, in the form of reduced court time devoted to presently-
existing motion practice litigating the issue of proper forum and other issues
addressed by the amendment." Id.
124 For an explanation of some of the economic implications of such statutes, see
Ribstein, supra note 113, at 1000.
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made in the written agreement. Accordingly, all fifty states
should enact statues such as UCC Revised Article 1 that provide
greater respect for party autonomy. 125 Such enactment would
make it even less likely that arbitrators would fail to respect
party autonomy, because they would know that the states' choice
of law rules would dictate following the parties' wishes.
V. THERE ARE No CONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER CONCERNS THAT
JUSTIFY A FAILURE TO RESPECT THE PARTIES' CHOICE OF LAW IN
DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Potential Constitutional Limitations
Some commentators have suggested that allowing parties to
choose a law that does not have an appropriate, reasonable, or
substantial connection with the underlying transaction or
parties would be unconstitutional. 126  In particular, these
commentators have suggested that such a practice may violate
the Due Process Clause' 27 and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 128 of the Constitution. The following discussion explains
these issues and why they should not be a concern in the context
of domestic commercial arbitration.
In construing due process requirements in the context of a
choice of law analysis, the Supreme Court has focused on
whether the parties could reasonably have anticipated that the
law chosen by the court would be applied. 129 The leading case,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,130 involved a suit against an insurance
company by the widow of an insured who died in a motorcycle
accident in Wisconsin while commuting between his work in
125 As discussed above, in adopting UCC Revised Article 1, states should amend
it slightly to allow parties to purely domestic transactions to choose foreign law if
they so desire. See supra text following note 104.
126 See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 8, at 1172-73; Rashkover, supra note 8, at
227-28. But see Sedler, supra note 8, at 67 (arguing that "the due process and full
faith and credit clauses do not operate to impose any significant limitations on the
power of state courts to make choice of law decisions.").
127 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
128 The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
129 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion).
130 Id.
20051
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Minnesota and his home in Wisconsin. In a plurality opinion,
the Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota court's application of
Minnesota law, stating:
In deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions, whether
under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, this Court has traditionally examined the contacts of
the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the
occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. In order
to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair, the Court has invalidated the choice of
law of a State which has had no significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
with the parties and the occurrence or transaction. 131
The Court continued by stating that "for a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."'132
Thus, the plurality opinion lumps together the analysis under
the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. 133
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to draw
attention to the distinction between the requirements of the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses in the context of a
131 Id. at 308 (citations and footnote omitted). This quote makes clear that the
majority of the Supreme Court believed it is not necessary to use a different
analysis for due process violations and full faith and credit violations in the context
of choice-of-law clauses. See also id. at 332-33 (Powell, J., dissenting):
My disagreement with the plurality is narrow. I accept with few
reservations Part II of the plurality opinion, which sets forth the basic
principles that guide us in reviewing state choice-of-law decisions under
the Constitution.
... [T]he Court has recognized that both the Due Process and the Full
Faith and Credit Clauses are satisfied if the forum has such significant
contacts with the litigation that it has a legitimate state interest in
applying its own law.
Id.; see infra note 133.
132 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion). The Court then
applied that test and found sufficient contacts between the parties and Minnesota
that made the application of Minnesota's law constitutionally permissible. See id. at
320.
133 The dissenters agreed that the "touchstone" for the constitutional inquiry is
the "reasonable expectation of the parties." See id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
They further agreed that in this case, the parties' expectations were not
compromised. See id. at 336. However, they believed that there were no significant
contacts with Minnesota that would create a legitimate state interest. See id. at
337.
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choice of law analysis.1 3 4 In Justice Stevens' view, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause may prevent the state whose law is chosen
from applying that law if doing so would unjustifiably infringe on
the sovereignty of another state.135 By contrast, the Due Process
Clause may prevent the state whose law is chosen from applying
that law because of fairness concerns. 136 Justice Stevens would
measure the fairness of the decision by the "justifiable
expectations" of the parties at the time of contracting.'
37
Regardless of which Allstate opinion is the most persuasive, none
of them place a heavy constitutional burden on choice of law
analyses. 138  Moreover, the constitutional concerns raised in
Allstate are not seriously implicated by the proposal advocated
herein for at least two reasons.
First, Allstate did not involve an express choice-of-law
provision agreed to by the parties. Rather, it involved a choice of
law made by a court after the occurrence of an incident with
connections to two states. Because of those multiple connections,
the Supreme Court said it was reasonable and should not
surprise the parties that more than one state's law could apply to
the matter. Where two parties have mutually agreed to have
their dispute governed by a particular law, neither can
reasonably argue surprise when the law chosen is the very one
that they agreed to. To the contrary, it likely would be quite
surprising to the parties if their choice of law was not applied
given the strong policies in favor of freedom of contract and party
autonomy. Thus, the case for applying the choice of law made by
the parties to an arbitration agreement is far stronger than the
case in Allstate and should not raise due process concerns.
Enforcement of the law chosen by the parties is clearly "fair"'
13 9
134 See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 327, 331.
138 See Sedler, supra note 8, at 74 (stating that the Court placed only "minimal
limitations on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions").
139 See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308. This analysis assumes that there are no
extenuating circumstances, such as fraud or overweening bargaining power. In such
an unusual case, exceptions to the general rule of applying the law chosen by the
parties could certainly be made. In fact, the FAA states that "corruption, fraud, or
undue means" are grounds for vacation of an award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2000).
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since it reflects the justifiable "expectations of the parties at the
time of contracting." 140
Second, because arbitration is generally private in nature it
does not implicate the public interests reflected in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is to ensure equality among the states of the union and
respect for one another's laws.141 These principles are usually
not implicated in a decision by a private arbitrator because the
arbitrator does not stand in the shoes of one state assessing
whether to respect another state's laws. Moreover, to the extent
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause may be implicated, some
legal scholars have suggested that the parties' mere selection of
a particular state's law will create the required contact with the
state to meet the constitutional concerns expressed in Allstate.142
One such scholar suggested that the Supreme Court may have
endorsed this approach in the Burger King case,143 when it
affirmed that a choice-of-law clause is a significant contact with
a jurisdiction. 144
B. Potential Public Policy Concerns
Another concern that some scholars have expressed is that
party autonomy can operate to undermine important public
policies.1 45  Parties may opt out of state laws that might
otherwise be applicable, thereby making that state's public
policies also inapplicable to the transaction. 146 Because of this
140 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J. concurring); see id. at 333 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
141 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Nastro v.
D'Onofrio, 822 A.2d 286, 290-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); see also Sedler, supra note 9,
at 96-97.
142 See, e.g., Friedler, supra note 2 at 498-500; Linda S. Mullenix, Another
Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in
Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 350 (1988).
143 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
144 Friedler, supra note 2, at 498-500. It must be pointed out, however, that
Burger King dealt with the issue of whether there were sufficient contacts with the
forum state for the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction, not for purposes of
choosing the applicable law. The Supreme Court has suggested that there is a
difference between these two analyses. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320-21 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring).
145 See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 8, at 1159-60; McConnaughay, supra note
8, at 257-58; Woodward, supra note 29, at 273-74.
146 Woodward suggests that in the commercial context, important public
policies are reflected in laws regarding usury, limitations on liquidated damages,
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concern, both the Restatement and the UCC contain exceptions
to the general rule in favor of party autonomy where application
of the chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of
the state whose law would have applied in the absence of the
parties' agreement.147
Professor Philip McConnaughay has criticized party
autonomy specifically on the ground that it carries a substantial
risk of under-regulation because parties are likely to choose a
law with lesser regulation than the forum's law would provide,
thereby leading to the occurrence of some harm the forum law
was intended to prevent. 148 There are several responses to this
argument. First, this argument assumes that the parties are
familiar with many systems of law and would choose the least
burdensome one, a questionable and unsupported assumption.
While a party may develop a familiarity with a particular
forum's law as a result of doing business there, the party is
unlikely to be familiar with most legal systems, especially where
the law is ambiguous or complicated.1 49 Second, as Professor
Larry Ribstein argued, allowing parties to avoid application of a
particular state's law may be more efficient because it allows
parties to avoid the application of inefficient mandatory rules
that were created to benefit small yet well-coordinated interest
groups rather than overall social welfare.1 50 Particularly in the
context of two commercial entities negotiating a sizable business
deal, it is reasonable to assume that the parties are sufficiently
sophisticated to protect themselves and do not need as much
protection from the legislature.
Moreover, the concern that parties may exempt themselves
from important public policies does not carry the same weight in
arbitration as it does in litigation. Arbitration is largely a
matter of private contract and arbitrators are appointed by way
of that contract. Therefore, unlike judges, arbitrators do not owe
and restrictions on unconscionable contracts. See Woodward, supra note 29, at 213.
These types of laws are often enacted to protect less knowledgeable parties. As
explained herein, such protection is not needed where the parties involved are
sophisticated commercial entities engaged in sizeable transactions.
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971); UCC § 1-
301(f) (2004).
148 See McConnaughay, supra note 8, at 257.
149 See LEW, supra note 2, at 103.
150 See Ribstein, supra note 23, at 366. But see Woodward, supra note 29, at
275-84 (offering some criticisms of Ribstein's economic analyses).
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loyalty to a particular state's public policy and should not
invalidate the parties' choice of law merely because the
arbitrators believe that some other state's laws and policies are
being undermined. Rather, the arbitrators owe their loyalty to
seeing that the parties' wishes are carried out according to the
terms of the contract.
Arbitrators do, however, have a duty to the parties to render
an award that is enforceable. If the arbitrators render an award
that is contrary to the public policy of the forum or of the place of
enforcement, the award may be unenforceable, leaving the
prevailing party without an adequate remedy. 151 Likewise, if the
law of the forum prohibits arbitration of certain kinds of
disputes, the court is likely to take jurisdiction and refuse to stay
proceedings pending arbitration. 152  Therefore, a prudent
arbitrator will take public policy into account even if the
arbitrator does not owe allegiance to that public policy in the
same way that a judge might.153
By contrast, a court called upon to review an arbitration
award does have a duty to respect his or her state's public
policies as reflected in the laws of that state. Although the FAA
does not state that arbitral awards may be vacated because they
violate public policy,1 54 the U.S. Supreme Court has created a
ground for vacatur where the public policy is "well defined and
dominant" and may "be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests."'1 55 Several courts have also recognized a public
policy ground for vacatur under state law as well.1 56 Thus, a
151 See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
152 See LEW, supra note 2, at 536-37.
153 See id.; see also Woodward, supra note 29, at 270.
154 The grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award under the FAA are found in 9
U.S.C. § 10 and do not include a public policy ground. By contrast, the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does permit a court
to refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award if "recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
Compare FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000), to U.N., U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, art. V(2)(b) (June
10, 1958), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
155 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)); see also E. Associated Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).
156 See, e.g., Am. and Nat'l Leagues of Profl Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 130 Cal. Rptr. 626, 628 (Ct. App. 1976); 1745 Wazee LLC v.
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reviewing court that believes an arbitral award to be contrary to
a fundamental public policy of the state may refuse to recognize
and enforce the award.
The relevance of the forum's public policy is one aspect of
domestic commercial arbitration that differs from international
commercial arbitration. Scholars who advocate for party
autonomy in international commercial arbitration sometimes do
so on the basis that international commercial arbitration is
independent of any one sovereign nation-state. 15 7 This theory of
independence reinforces the idea that arbitrators of
international disputes owe their allegiance to the agreement
creating their appointment rather than to any national legal
system. By contrast, in domestic commercial arbitration, all of
the contacts are with one sovereign nation-state. Therefore, an
argument can be made that the arbitrators in a domestic
commercial arbitration owe allegiance to U.S. law.
United States law and policy regarding arbitration is
reflected in the FAA.158 The FAA directs arbitrators and courts
to abide by the agreement of the parties, including the parties'
choice of law.1 59 Therefore, even if arbitrators in a domestic
commercial arbitration owe allegiance to the law of the United
States, that law directs the arbitrators to respect party
autonomy. In addition, just as arbitrators in international
commercial arbitration would have to choose between the laws of
competing sovereign nation-states, arbitrators in domestic
commercial arbitration involving contacts with more than one
state must choose between the laws of equal and competing
states of the United States. Thus, despite certain differences
between domestic and international commercial arbitration, the
similarities may still outweigh them. As such, theories
supporting party autonomy in an international commercial
arbitration are applicable to support party autonomy in domestic
commercial arbitration by way of analogy.
Castle Builders, Inc., 89 P.3d 422, 425-26 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Int'l Bhd. of Police
Officers v. Town of Windsor, 483 A.2d 626, 628 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); City of
Harvey v. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees (AFSCME), 776 N.E.2d
683, 689, (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); United Fed'n of Teachers, v. Bd. of Educ., 1 N.Y.3d 72,
78-80, 801 N.E.2d 827, 831-33, 769 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455-57 (2003); Ohio Council 8 v.
Trumbull Mem'l Hosp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 482, 486 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
157 See Croff, supra note 33, at 618-20.
158 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
159 See supra Part III.
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Finally, some critics may also argue that parties should not
be allowed to choose a law to govern their arbitration agreement
if it has no connection to the parties or the transaction, because
that state's resources should not be expended to resolve a
dispute in which it has no interest. While it is possible that a
chosen state's resources could be implicated in resolving the
dispute, one of the purposes of arbitration is to resolve the
dispute privately without using state resources. Thus, the
state's judicial system is not utilized unless a party fails to
comply with the agreement to arbitrate and a court order is
needed to enforce the arbitration agreement, or if a party goes to
court to vacate or confirm an arbitral award. In addition, if
states with major commercial centers like New York, Illinois,
and California have examined the issue and have decided that
the benefits of respecting party autonomy outweigh the slightly
increased burden on the state's resources, there is truly no
reason not to enforce that choice.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is an attractive method of dispute resolution for
commercial parties because it allows the parties a great deal of
choice and control over the process. It also promotes certainty
and predictability in business relations, thereby making
commerce more efficient. Allowing commercial parties the
greatest freedom of choice possible and requiring arbitrators and
courts to respect the choices made by the parties will encourage
the use of arbitration because it will allow the parties to obtain
the benefits of arbitration. As a society, we want to encourage
resolution of disputes through arbitration because arbitration
facilitates commerce and frees up court dockets and associated
public resources. Therefore, arbitrators, courts, and legislatures
should adopt and follow rules that require respect for party
autonomy in domestic commercial arbitration, just as is done in
international commercial arbitration.
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